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HAVE THIRD-WORLD ARMS INDUSTRIES REDUCED ARMS IMPORTS? 
I. Introduction 
In 1945 only Argentina, Brazil, India and South Africa 
in the Third World possessed domestic arms indus-
tries which produced weapons systems other than 
small arms and ammunition (SIPRI, 1987, 76). By the 
end of the 1960s, however, twentyseven Third World 
countries were producing equipment for their armed 
forces. For the most part, production was still largely 
confined to small arms and ammunition. Finally, in 
the early 1980s, according to Wulf(SIPRI 1985, 329-
30), eleven Third World countries had established air-
craft industries, while nine countries had developed 
indigenous shipbuilding industries, and six nations 
produced missiles and armored vehicles. While the 
number of new Third World nations with domestic 
defence programs seems to have slowed down 
somewhat since the mid-1980s, some.of the advanced 
weapons systems in these countries had reached the 
point where they were competing with established 
arms suppliers (Evans 1986, 99). 
The growing importance of this industry in the 
Third World has led to an increased concern about its 
impact on government budgets, foreign exchange 
use, and the overall performance of the economy. 
There is an increasing awareness that public enter-
prises, in general, and specifically, defense industries 
can be a major source of macroeconomic problems 
(Gray 1984, Tehral 1982, Ayres, 1983). 
To date, most of the literature on the subject has 
emphasized strategic and political factors as the pre-
dominant motives underlying the creation of arms 
industries in developing countries (Vayrynen 1979, 
66): 
The establishment of the domestic arms industry is 
often predominantly a political act which naturally 
has strong economic and technological underpin-
nings. The domestic capacity to produce weapons 
is a means of isolating oneself of the political and 
commercial pressures which the suppliers of 
advanced weapon systems, both governments and 
firms, can apply. That is why the arms-production 
capacity is concentrated in those developing coun-
tries which have faced an actual or a threat of an 
arms embargo and/or which have become 
involved in protracted regional conflicts. 
What literature there is on the subject has tended to 
concentrate largely on the economic incentives used 
to encourage the expansion and possible exportation 
of arms by the developing countries (Looney 1986a, 
Katz 1984, Naur 1980 Adekanye 1983, Ross 1981). 
Presumably, one of the major reasons for establishing 
indigenous manufacturing capability is to reduce the 
level of arms imports, thus alleviating somewhat the 
overall pressures on the balance-of-payments. Inter-
estingly enough, the literature has had little to say on 
this aspect of the subject Nor has there been any 
detailed empirical examination of the impact that 
indigenous production has had on Third World arms 
imports. 
In a major paper, however, Vayrynen (1979, 66) 
argues that indigenous production of various types of 
weapons systems in developing countries is unlikely 
to produce overall reductions in total arms imports: 
The domestic production of arms is, indeed, an 
effort to ensure capacity to pursue independent 
foreign and military policy. This independence is, 
however, often a mere myth because the domestic 
production of arms only seldom significantly cur-
tails the import of arms and even if this happens the 
dependence of foreign military technology 
assumes only new, and even deeper forms. The 
economic effects of arms imports are mostly finan-
cial by their character, while the dependence on 
technology and intermediary inputs needed in the 
military industry has a negative impact on the 
entire industrial structure of the country. 
This image of indigenous Third World arms pro-
duction seems to be borne out to a certain extent by 
the ·limited amount of information we have on these 
industries. What statistics we have on the subject 
come largely from SIPRI sources (Brzoska and Ohl-
son 1986). SIPRI's data values weapons produced 
under license as both production and imports. This 
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share not only reflects the substitution of production 
for imports, but it also indicates the degree of inde-
pendence in Third World arms production. The 
SIPRI data show (Brzoska and Ohlson 1986, 27) a 
slow but steady increase in arms import replacement 
during the 1960s after which the ratio levelled off 
at about 10 percent during the 1970s. The large 
increases in arms imports during the 1970s by a num-
ber of countries without sizeable anns production -
such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria -
explain the levelling off despite the steady increase in 
total production values. 
For the 1980s, thereisagainanupward trend. Inter-
estingly enough, however, the SIPRI figures show that 
it is not the countries with the highest production 
values that have become least dependent on arms 
imports. The import values are still much higher than 
the production values in India and Israel. In India, 
substitution is even decreasing. The highest produc-
tion-to-import ratios are instead found in Brazil (also 
reflecting substantial anns exports), North Korea and 
South Africa To a lesser extent this is also true for 
South Korea and Taiwan (Brzoska and Ohlson 1986, 
28). 
If this is in fact the case, it would appear that the 
arms industry in developing countries is following a 
path fairly typically produced by the package of pol-
icies often used to encourage import-substitution 
industrialization. In this regard the_ literature on 
import-substitution has been fairly negative, again 
much of it questioning whether or not the programs 
associated with import-substitution have resulted in 
reducing imports in those sectors singled out for 
import replacement As Bruton (1970, 124) notes, the 
term "import substitution" has a variety of meanings 
in the literature: 
When attention is limited to a single product, there 
is little difficulty. Here IS refers to a policy that 
reduces or eliminates entirely the importation of 
the commodity and hence, leaves the domestic 
market exclusive for domestic producers. 
Measures of IS that are based on changes in the 
ratio of imports of specific products to their total 
domestic absorption are of course concerned with 
this definition. Difficulties emerge when we seek to 
aggregate. A policy that reduces the proportion of 
the quantity of a product that is imported may at the 
same time increase that proportion of another 
product. Whether the policy in this case should be 
called IS becomes ambiguous. Similarly, changes 
in the aggregate import-GNP ratio tend to hide the 
impact of IS policies on specific sectors. 
While it is apparent that the import substitution 
policies in the arms industry initiated by a number of 
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developing countries have actually reduced the 
imports of specific armaments, have these same pol-
icies resulted in a general reduction in arms imports? 
If the arms industry is a typical import substitution 
industry, historical precedent would probably suggest 
that the answer is no. 
The purpose of this article is to throw some light on 
the link between indigenous arms production and 
arms imports in developing countries. Specifically: 
1. Have developing countries producing arms been 
able to significantly reduce their importation of 
arms, relative to non-arms producing countries? 
and 
2. What other variables significantly affect the impor-
tation of arms by developing countries? 
2. Unique Features of the Anns Trade 
As noted above, the arms trade is unique, and its rapid 
growth since the Second World War can be partly 
explained by the economic and political policies pur-
sued by the major suppliers. The policy on supply 
adopted by each country is invariably determined by 
political decisions which may reflect not only the posi-
tion of the supplying country in the international sys-
tem, but also in the case of Western countries, of the 
economic profitability of these sales (Albrecht 1986, 
Brigagao 1986, Klieman 1986). Broadly speaking, 
there are three factors that determine the pattern and 
level of supply of arms (Ayres 1983, 813). 
1. The hegemony factor - which refers to the con-
trol ofarms transfers by a supplier in order to main-
tain or achieve a position of hegenomy or domina-
tion, either within the receiving country, or more 
widely within the Third World. 
2. The economic profitability factor - which relates 
to the economic advantages oflarge-scale produc-
tion and long production runs. Both the govern-
ment in the form of the military, and the firms pro-
ducing arms benefit by selling more and thereby 
reducing unit costs. As long as an item is procured 
by a country's armed forces, the cost to the govern-
ment drops correspondingly, but firms may also 
benefit with higher profits. 
3. The restrictive factor - whereby the supplier de-
clines to provide arms to other countries if it is 
likely to operate against the economic and/or 
hegemony interests of the supplier. 
Presumably, one of the major motivations to pro-
duce arms in the Third World is to avoid the restrictive 
factor. Clearly, the manner in which the restrictive fac-




Argentina during 1982 had the effect of reinforcing 
the intentional of several countries (e.g., Brazil, 
Libya, Turkey, and Argentina herself) to achieve a 
minimum level of self-sufficiency in arms production. 
As Ayres (1983, 813-14) notes, the rapid expansion in 
both the numbers of producers and the types of 
weapons produced in the Third World is primarily 
related to concern about availability of supply from 
the major producers. 
As noted earlier, many developing countries have 
hoped that indigenous arms industries would reduce 
their overall import requirements as part of a general 
policy of import-substitution industrilization. To 
these ends, the build-up of domestic arms production 
capacities can be considered in terms of seven stages: 
1. arms are imported, but are serviced and main-
tained domestically; 
2. a license to produce arms is acquired and produc-
tion facilities are built, but requiring huge technical 
and personnel assistance from the supplier; 
3. production starts, and to begin with, involves 
local assembly of imported sub-assemblies; 
4. the sub-assemblies are assembled locally from 
imported components and sometimes re-exported 
to the licenser; 
5. components are manufactured locally from 
imported raw materials; 
6. local production of raw materials; 
7. complete indigenous production including design, 
raw materials, and manufacture. 
Few, if any, developing countries are at stage seven 
of the production sequence. Of relevance for imports 
of arms is the fact that stages one through three 
undoubtedly are associated with increased imports of 
arms or at least of goods and services related to mili-
tary production. It is unlikely that arms imports could 
actually show a significant reduction until the country 
had reached stage five or six in the production se-
quence. 
Clearly, then, indigenous arms production in the 
Third World could be associated at any time with 
either reduced or increased levels of imports The 
following sections attempt to determine empirically 
which of these situations has dominated. More pre-
cisely the purpose of the empirical tests below is to 
determine whether there have been statistically sig-
nificant reductions in arms imports in the Third 
World as a result of indigenous production. 
3. Factors Affecting Third World Arms Imports 
A number of economic and political factors interact to 
affect, the level of Third World arms imports. The 
model developed below attempts to capture the 
impact of as many of these variables as possible, 
recognizing, of course that in any one year, arms 
imports may deviate considerably from their average 
or normal levels due to: 
1. a big purchase, associated with the adoption of a 
major new weapons system; 
2. the break-out of internal or external conflict; 
3. the completion of a phase of equipment modern-
ization; 
4. a marked change in government priorities, due 
to a change in regime; and 
5. a shift in foreign alliances. 
This list is of course not exhaustive, but simply 
intended to stress the potential year-to-year instability 
of imports. 
For many countries, incremental increases in arms 
imports are not possible simply because the high cost 
of major weapons systems (relative to their total 
import bill), and the fact that weapons systems tend to 
be sold in "packages", rather than as individual items 
· or components. Given these caveats, it is hypothe-
sized that arms imports in any one year are a function 
of: 
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1. total military expenditures (ME). 
2. total imports (TI). 
3. total resources, as depicted by the gross national 
product (GNP). 
4. central government expenditures (GEC). 
5. armed forces (AF). 
6. the balance of payments deficit (Bl). and 
7. the regime type (MILITARY). 
Most of these variables are self-explanatory. It is 
assumed here that arms imports ceteris paribus 
should be higher, the larger overall military budgets, 
gross national product and armed forces. However it 
is not clear from the literature1 which of these 
variables should, given political and strategic factors, 
be most influential in setting the overall bounds for 
arms imports. Hence each was tested in the regression 
equation. The import variable (TI) is intended to cap-
ture some of the progress made in armament import 
substitution. If, in fact, indigenous arms production 
has reached the point ofactually enabling a country to 
reduce its required level of arms imports, then we 
would expect to find a negative sign for this term. 
For non-arms producers, on the other hand, total 
imports are undoubtedly reflective of the ability of 
these countries to earn or borrow foreign exchange, 
since most developing countries are foreign exchange 




riksen and Looney 1985). Hence, we can assume that 
at any time, a pent-up demand for additional imports 
of all kinds exists. In this context, increased total 
imports would undoubtedly have ceteris paribus a sig-
nificant military component The ability to finance 
additional imports at any one time can be proxied by 
the current account deficit of the balance-of-pay-
ments. If, in fact, non-arms producing countries are 
constrained by foreign exchange in importing addi-
tional arms, the balance-of-payments term should 
have a negative sign, i.e., the greaterthe deficit in cur-
rent account, the more external finance available for 
arms importation. 
In terms of political variables, the literature 
(Grindle 1987) McKinlay and Cohen 1975, Looney 
1987) tends to suggest that military regimes may cete-
ris paribus be more inclined to import arms. This 
undoubtedly reflects the overall priorities of these 
regimes. It might, however, also reflect the fact that 
during periods ofincreased hostility, stemming either 
from increased internal insurrection or external 
threat, military regimes often come to power 
(Richards 1985). To test for this factor, the political 
variable (MILITARY) was given a value ofO for civil-
ian regimes, and 1 for military regimes2. A positive 
sign would, therefore, confirm the tendency for mili-
tary regimes to shift resources toward imported arma-
ments. 
Formally, therefore, we may specify arms produ-
cer's demand for arms imports (Al), together with 
their expected signs, as: 
AI= f(ME+, TI-, GNP+, GEC+, AF+, MILITA-
RY+, BI+) 
For non-arms producers the same function would 
produce several differences in expected signs: 
Al= f(ME+, TI+, GNP+, GEC+, AF+, MILITA-
RY+, BI-) • 
All the data is taken from the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (1987), and is for 
the year 19813• 
The classification of countries as an arms or non-
arms producer is based on Neuman's (1984) analysis. 
In general, Neuman classifies a country (as of1979-
80) as an arms producer if it produces at least one 
major weapon system. Depending on the complete-
ness of data and the variables included in the regres-
sion equations, the number of producers averages 
around twenty countries (due to missing observa-
tions), while the number of non-producers averages 
around 48 countries. 
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4. Results: Anns and Non-Anns Producers 
, I 
The results4 for both the producers and non-produc-
ers show a number ofinteresting contrasts, several of 
which were not anticipated above (Table 1): 
1. The producing countries tend to exhibit a much 
closer relationship between arms imports and total 
military expenditures than their non-producer 
counterparts. For arms accounting for sixty five 
percent of the gross country differences in arms 
imports (equation 1 Table 1). On the other hand, 
military expenditures were statistically insignifi-
cant for the non-producers. 
2. The most significant variable affecting non-pro-
ducers arms imports was the total level of imports 
(Tl). On the other hand, this variable was negative 
and statistically insignificant for the arms produc-
ers. This result appears to confirm that, in general, 
arms production in the producing countries may 
have reached the point whereby significant reduc-
tions in arms imports are possible. On the other 
hand, arms imports of the non-producing coun-
tries appear to be largely a function of the overall 
ability of these countries to finance imports. This is 
further confirmed by the statistically significant 
sign on the balance of payments (BI) term (equa-
tion 10 Table 1) for the non-producers. 
3. Gross National Product (GNP) or the overall 
eC()nomic strength of the country does not appear 
to be a factor affecting the overall level of arms 
imports (after controlling for total military expen-
ditures, ME). This result may also be in conformity 
with the notion that foreign exchange, rather than 
the overall level of resources is the binding con-
straint (Landow 1971) affecting arms imports, par-
ticularly in the case of the non-producers. 
4. Military regimes appear more likely than their 
civilian counterparts to expand arms imports. This 
result (equation 9 Table 1), however, apparently 
only holds for the non-producers. 
In sum, several interesting factors appear to differ-
entiate arms producers from their non-producer 
counterparts with regard to their propensities to 
import arms. The close relationship between arms 
imports and total military spending in the producing 
countries may reflect the fact that the producing coun-
tries do not appear to be as constrained by foreign 
exchange as the non-producers. 
As the work of Looney and Frederiksen (1986a, 
Looney 1987 a) demonstrates, one of the major differ-
ences between arms producers and non-producers in 
the Third World tends to be the relative abundance of 
.. 
Table I 
Factors affecting Third World arms imports: producing, non-producing countries (standardized estimates) 
Independent variables Statistics 
Equation 
Producers 














0.95 -0.29 -0.12 
(7.09) (-1.90) (-0.77) 
0.90 -0.34 -0.83 0.80 
(7.17) (-2.42) (-2.05) (1.92) 
0.68 -0.30 -1.32 1.21 
(3.41) (-2.17) (-2.54) (2.49) 
0.91 -0.35 -0.81 -0.78 
(6.94) (-2.35) (-1.90) (1.81) 
0.87 0.40 -1.03 1.03 
(6.83) (-2.74) (-2.41) (2.32) 






















(8) Non Producers 0.46 
(1.40) 
1.39 -0.89 -0.34 0.18 







0.19 -0.03 -0.02 
(1.49) (-0.29) (-0.87) 
1.42 -0.68 -0.03 
(6.52) (-0.02) (-0.87) 
0.19 
(3.34) 0.857 51.44 
-0.22 
(-2.09) 0.837 43.27 
48 
47 
i1 = coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; DP = degrees of freedom 
foreign exchange possessed by the producing coun-
tries, and the scarcity of foreign exchange in the non-
producing countries. If, in fact, there tends to be some 
optimal stock of military equipment (Looney and Fre-
deriksen 1986b) given a level of militarY expendi-
tures, both the indigenous production capabilities 
and import capacity of the arms producers would 
allow adjustments of the actual stock of equipment to 
the desired level to occur much more smoothly than 
in the case of the non-producers. 
For the purposes ofthis article, however, it appears 
that the most important finding is that arms producers 
have been able to significantly reduce their levels of, 
and dependence on, eternal sources of arms. If, in 
fact, this was the underlying motive in these countries 
for producing arms, then we must conclude that they 
have been successful. 
All in all, the results suggest that somewhat differ-
ent environments affecting arms imports exist in the 
19 
Third World, and that any analysis of this problem 
must take these differences explicitly into account 
5. Results: Qmstrained and Unconstrained Countries 
It appears from the results presented above that for a 
large group of countries, foreign exchange may be the 
most important factor affecting arms imports. As with 
many issues concerning Third World countries, the 
economic literature is somewhat vague as to the 
"best" model to specify for purposes of hypothesis 
testing. As a result, many empirical findings are more 
or less predetermined by the manner in which the 
research design was conceptualized. One way to over-
come these difficulties is to attempt to determine the 
generality of findings, through constructing alterna-
tive research designs. 
As indicated above, an alternative classification of 
developing countries could be based on their relative 
degree of resource constraint In other words, given 
the fact that import capacity was a major factor affect-
ing arms imports for non-producing countries, addi-
tional insights into the factors affecting arms imports 
should be obtained by examining the patterns of 
imports associated with the constrained and uncon-
strained groups of countries. 
The operational question here is how best to group 
countries on the basis of relative resource constraint 
Clearly there is not one overall index that can be used 
for that purpose. Since the problem of resource con-
straint is a multi-dimensional one, we decided to use 
factor and discriminant analysis for country grouping. 
Table 2 
This procedure enables an objective classification of 
countri~ in a situation where one might be tempted 
to interject subjective impressions of relative resource 
abundance. 
Based on these considerations a factor analysis was 
performed using a number5 of measures of debt and 
capital flows, the main trends in the data were ident-
ified (Table 2) and a discriminant analysis6 was then 
performed using as variables those with the highest 
loading7 on each one of the (seven) factors or main 
trends in the data. The orthogonal rotation (Table 2) 
assures that each variable selected had a relatively low 
degree of correlation with the others in the sample. 
Orthogonally Rotated Factor Pattern: (Loadings) Economic Variables 
Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Variables Factors Factors Gross Share of Growth External Public 
Facilitating Contributing International 1982 Public in Debt External 
Public to 1982 Reserves External Exports Service Debt 
Con- External Debt in 1982 1970 
sumption Debt GDP 
Gross Inflow Public Loans/Exports 1982 97* 0 -14 8 2 - 9 s 
Public Debt/Exports 1982 96* . 3 -13 2 - 4 -13 6 
Resource Balance as% of GDP 1982 94* 11 1 -14 7 7 7 
Growth in Public Consumption 1970-82 92* 3 - 5 4 26 - 7 2 
Public External Borrowing 
Commitments/Exports 1982 91* - 4 -13 8 12 -11 23 
Gross Inflow Public Loans/GDP 1982 86* 7 - 8 - 2 -11 -13 -25 
Public Consumption as % of GDP 1982 63* - 5 - 9 55 -13 - 5 27 
Growth in Private Consumption 1970-1982 62* 12 10 1 48 8 2 
Private Consumption as% of GDP 1960 -72* 7 -15 -16 1 -13 -44 
Private Consumption as% of GDP 1982 -82* -15 -16 -28 -11 -19 -10 
Terms of Trade 1982 -83* 21 21 9 10 17 - 5 
Total Public External Debt 1982 0 94* 11 0 20 20 - 4 
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1970 14 92* 20 - 7 -18 - 7 9 
Interest Payments on External Debt 1970 9 90* 13 -16 -20 2 -10 
Repayment of Principal on Public Loans 
1982 4, 89* 10 -11 -15 12 -17 
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1982 
- 5 86* 10 1 29 28 -11 
Public External Borrowing Commitments 
1982 - 6 85* 14 - 4 34 18 - 4 
Interest Payments on External Debt 1982 
- 6 82* 6 2 30 38 - 8 
Total Public Esternal Debt 1970 15 80* 19 -14 -23 -30 10 
Net Inflow of Public External Loans 1970 19 77* 23 
- 2 -17 -19 25 
Repayment of Principal on External Loans 
1982 - 4 73* 21 5 31 37 7 
Growth in Exports 1970-82 - 2 39* 25 3 s - 8 -36 
Current Account Balance 1970 15 -80* - 1 - 6 -29 1 10 
Gross International Reserves 1982 
-.8 19 89* -11 9 - 7 9 
Gross International Reserves 1970 - 8 29 85* - 5 - 7 1 - 6 
Average Maturity of Public External Debt 23 -18 -48* 5 -11 -43 23 
Current Account Balance 1982 13 -26 -59* 10 -22 0 21 
Public External Debt as % of GDP 1982 9 - 9 -29 76* -15 12 17 
Exports as %ofGDP 1982 - 8 - 8 7 76* 4 22 5 
Growth in Exports 1960-1970 8 2 - 6 67* 7 -27 -24 
Public Consumption as% of GDP 1960 47 -11 -12 55* 20 -18 37 
Growth in Imports 1970-82 36 -18 19 - 1 71* - 6 1 
External Debt Service as %ofGDP 1982 - 8 27 - 7 5 - 6 59* 7 
Public External Debt as % of GDP 1970 50 0 -23 20 5 - 1 s5• 




The variables thus selected for splitting the coun-
tries into two groups were: 
1. Gross Inflow of Public Loans/Exports, 1982 
2. Total Public External Debt, 1982 
Table 3 
3. Gr~ International Reserves, 1982 
4. Public External Debt as a % of GDP, 1982 
5. Growth in Imports, 1970-82 
6. External Debt Service as a% of GDP, 1982 
7. Public External as a% of GDP, 1970 
Discriminant Analysis Total Sample Countries Based on Economic Factor Analysis High Loadings 
Group I Group II 
Country Probability of Country Probability of 
Correct Placement Correct Placement 
1. Israel 69.34 1. Greece 57.78 
2. Honduras 83.48 2. India 84.91 
3. Cameroon 60.73 3. Nigeria 89.07 
4. Sudan 66.47 4. Indonesia 90.67 
5. Costa Rica 92.64 5. Egypt 68.20 
6. Bolivia 86.27 6. Korea 89.95 
7. Somalia 86.46 7. Rwanda 69.08 
8. Tunisia 68.31 8. Turkey 66.95 
9. Morocco 73.06 9. Spain 51.89 
10. Guatemala 54.91 10. Venezuela 80.26 
11. Malawi 91.40 11. Mexico 99.69 
12. El Salvador 65.90 12. Brazil 99.02 
13. Mali 97.12 13. Algeria 76.44 
14. Pakistan 86.98 14. Philippines 55.78 
15. Paraguay 60.02 15. Libya 75.69 
16. Ecuador 56.61 16. Colombia 54.63 
17. Dominican Republic 74.12 17. Thailand 60.95 
18. Liberia 94.77 18. Malaysia 65.16 
19. Ivory Coast 84.42 19. Argentina 66.09 
20. Mauritania 96.04 20. Saudi Arabia 94.65 
21. Sierra Leone 86.05 21. Kuwait 81.31 
22. Panama 94.37 22. Syria 63.95 
23. Chile 70.09 23. Jordan 50.81 
24. Chad 87.18 
25. Uruguay 67.87 
26. Tanzania 79.87 
27. Uganda 88.76 
28. Ethiopia 70.24 
29. Central African Republic 76.89 
30. Ghana 78.72 
31. Burma 82.91 
32. Sri Lanka 75.39 
33. Jamaica 90.66 
34. Trinidad 77.62 
35. Zambia 95.88 
36. Peru 71.67 
3 7. Zimbabwe 85.68 
38. Kenya 86.61 
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The results of the discriminant analysis (Table 3) 
show a high degree of probability of correct place-
ment in each group, i.e., the discriminating variables 
selected from the factor analysis are able to split the 
sample countries into two fairly distinct groupings 
based largely on the external debt situation facing 
each set of countries. The Group II or unconstrained 
countries consist of several major oil exporters and 
several of the more dynamic newly industrializing 
nations such as Mexico, Greece, India, Korea, Spain, 
Algeria, and Malaysia Group I or constrained coun-
tries in general seem to be the poorer, less economic 
dynamic nations, this group being heavily weighted 
with African and poorer Latin American countries. 
Further insight into the two groups can be gained 
by examining the means (Table 4) of various 
measures of economic performance for each group: 
1. Group I countries resorted to a much higher (3.6 
times) inflow of external public loans in 1982 rela-
tive to their exports that year; 
2. On the other hand, the overall level of total public 
external debt in 1982 averages nearly four and 
one half times as much for Group II countries as is 
the case for Group I countries; 




FEB Share of fuels, minerals in merchandise exports 1982 
EI Export instability 1968-71 
ZGB Growth in imports 1970-82 
EGB Growth in exports 1970-82 
EGA Growth in exports 1960-70 
EB Share of Exports in GDP 1982 
CAA Current account Balance 1970 
CAB Current account Balance 1982 
OPCEB Share of other primary commodities in exports 1982 
IMPFB Share of food imports in merchandise imports 1982 
External Debt Variables 
PDA External public debt 1970 
PDB External public debt 1982 
POPA External public debt as % GDP 1970 
PDPB External public debt as % GDP 1982 
DSEA External public debt as % exports 1970 
DSEB External public debt as % exports 1982 
BCIBE Gross inflow of public external debt as % exports 1982 
Fiscal-Savings Variables 
AS Average national savings 1970-81 
MS Average marginal national survey 197$)-81 
RTCRYB Government revenues as O/o GDP 1982 
GE1YB Government expenditures as % GDP 1982 
GDB Government deficits as % of GDP 1982 
OJmposition of GDP 
AB Share of agriculture in GDP 1982 
IB Share of industry in GDP 1982 
MB Share of manufactures in GDP 1982 
SB Share of services in GDP 1982 
Pelformance Variables 
GDPGB Growth in GDP 1970-82 
IMFB Inflation 1970-82 
GDIGB Growth investment 1978-82 
GDIB Share of investment in GDP 1982 
ICOR Investment capital output ratio 1968-73 
GIRA Gross international reserves 1970 
GIRP Gross international reserves 1982 














































































3. The level of international reseives is also much 
higher for Group II countries - nearly 10 times as 
much as the average for group I countries; 
4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic 
product, however, Group I countries have much 
lighter levels of commitment, averaging nearly 
twice as much as Group II countries in both 1970 
and 1972. The debt setvice ratio to exports is corre-
spondingly higher for Group I countries; and 
5. The rate of growth of imports was nearly ten 
times higher over the 1970-82 period for Group II 
countries. 
In terms of profiles, therefore, the Group II coun-
tries are considerably larger, more affluent, and less 
reliant on external debt as a percentage of gross 
domestic product They tend to spend relatively large 
amounts on military activities, but not necessarily 
significantly greater amounts of their overall budgets. 
Modifying the model of arms imports developed 
above for the producer and non-producer countries, 
we hypothesize that for the constrained and uncon-
strained countries, arms imports are a function of; 
Table 5 
Factors affecting Third World arms imports: 
1. total military expenditures (ME); 
2. new external debt (debt contracted for the same 
year as the arms imports)7. 
3. whether or not the country was an arms produc-
er (PRODUCE). Here, the producer countries are 
assigned a value of one while the non-producing 
economies were assigned a value of zero. Hence, a 
negative and statistically significant sign for this 
variable would suggest that producing countries 
were able ceteris paribus to reduce their overall 
level of arms imports. 
4. total governmental expenditures (GEC). 
5. arms imports in the previous year (AI80) were 
included to test the robustness of the results and 
also to partially determine whether or not 1981 was 
an "unusual" year in the sense that the levels of 
arms imports that year were significantly different 
than those in the previous year. 
6. Gross National Product (GNP) was again in-
cluded as a control variable. 
constrained, unconstrained countries (standardized estimates) 
Independent variables Statistics 
Equation ME -PBCB Produce GEC AI80 GNP r2 F DF 
Constrained Countries 
(1) 0.93 0.13 -0.11 
(15.55) (2.13) (-2.18) 0.948 190.03 34 
(2) 0.75 0.16 -0.10 0.18 
...• 
(7.19) (3.51) (-2.77) (1.73) 0.974 275.18 33 
(3) 0.67 0.12 -0.10 0.30 
(10.10) (2.72) (-2.75) (5.26) 0.974 266.10 33 
(4) 0.70 0.14 -0.08 0.30 -0.08 
(10.78) (3.19) (-2.07) (5.43) (-1.97) 0.977 234.77 33 
Unconstrained Countries 
(5) 0.50 -0.28 -0.34 
(3.08) (1.69) (-2.08) 0.551 6.96 20 
(6) 0.27 -0.11 -0.11 0.72 
(3.12) (-1.33) (-1.22) (7.25) 0.895 34.17 20 
(7) 0.24 -0.15 -0.12 0.71 0.06 
(2.12) (-1.08) (-1.23) (7.05) (0.36) 0.896 25.86 20 
r2 = coefficient of determination DF = Degree of freedom 
F = F Statistics ( ) = t statistic 
23 
Based on the discussion above, the model tested 
(with its expected signs for the constrained countries) 
was of the form: 
Arms Imports (AI)= f(ME+, PBCB+, PRODUCE-, 
GEC+ AI80+ GNP+) 
While for the unconstrained countries: 
Arms Imports (AI)= f(ME+, PBCB+, PRODUCE-
GEC+ Al80+, GNP+) 
The results (Table 5) indicate that: 
1. As with non-producers, arms imports in con-
strained countries have a particularly strong link 
with total military expenditures. This link, while 
still significant is not nearly as strong (evidenced by 
the size of the standardized regression coefficient 
and t values) for the unconstrained countries. 
2. As anticipated, increased external debt (PBCB) 
has been associated with arms imported by the 
constrained countries (but not the unconstrained). 
3. Both constrained and unconstrained countries 
were ceteris paribus able to reduce their overall 
level of arms imports through the indigenous pro-
duction of arms. 
4. 1981 does not appear all that unusual a year 
(given the high degree of correlation of arms 
imports that year with those of the previous year). 
5. Again, the overall availability of resources as pro-
xied by Gross National Product does not appear to 
be a factor affecting Third World' arms imports. 
In general, therefore, the result obtained by exa-
mining countries as resource constrained and 
unconstrained paints essentially the same picture as 
that produced through an examination of countries 
grouped on the basis (or lack of) of an indigenous 
arms industry. 
6. Omclusions 
The results of the empirical work undertaken above 
can be easily summarized: 
1. Indigenous arms production in the Third World 
has tended to reduce the importation of arms. 
2. The arms imports themselves are largely affect-
ed by foreign exchange availability, rather than 
political or strategic factors. This point needs some 
elaboration. When examining the arms imports of 
arms producers and non-producers, the highest 
correlation coefficients were in the mid-80s. The 
specifications included such political variables as 
the type of government and to a certain extent the 
total number of men under arms as a proxy for 
internal-external conflict 
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3. On the other hand the groupings of countries on 
the basis of relative scarcity of foreign exchange 
produced correlation coefficients in the high 90s 
for the foreign exchange constrained countries. 
Given that only economic variables were used in 
these regressions it appears that foreign exchange 
controls the amount of arms imports much more 
precisely than the "need" or "desire", for additional 
armaments. The lower correlation coefficient for 
the unconstrained countries, together with the sig-
nificantly smaller regression coefficient (and small-
er t value) on the militazy expenditure term for this 
group of countries indicates that Third World arms 
producers have much more flexibility and choice 
as to arms imports (presumably because they are 
not limited in their imports of arms to the extent 
that the constrained countries are). 
4. Finally, it appears that arms imports will most 
likely not reach levels attained in the late 1970s due 
not so much to a general spirit of constraint on the 
part of suppliers and recipients, -but more to lack of 
money on part of many of the Third World coun-
tries and the development of indigenous produc-
tion capabilities on the part of others. 
NOIBS 
1. Obviously there is quite a high degree of correla-
tion between these variables making definitive 
statistical tests extremely difficult 
2. The classification used for military and civilian 
regimes was that developed by Sivard (1983, 11). 
3. 1981 was selected as the year for analysis largely 
because of the completeness of data for that year, 
and because this year preceded the distripution in 
world trade caused by the August 1982 world debt 
crisis. 
4. The regression coefficients are in standardized 
form to facilitate a direct comparison of the relative 
strength of each variable in impacting on arms 
imports. 
5. Data were taken from World Bank (1984) and 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (1984 ). 
6. For a description of the discriminant analysis pro-
gram see Statistical Analysis System (1982). The 
sample of countries was initially assigned an arbit-
rary one or zero so that placement could be made 
into two groups. A three-group division of coun-
tries did not produce a clear split between the cen-
troids of the groups, i.e., there was not a high prob-
! 
• 
ability of correct placement for each country in 
one of the three groups! 
7. An excellent description of factor analysis tech-
niques used is in Rummel (1970). 
8. The variable used for this purpose is the World 
Bank's "public external commitments", described 
in World Bank (1984). 
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